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A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation,
Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars
Kristin M. Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Lee J. M. Seymour
How do we conceptualize the fragmentation of internally divided movements? And how does variation in fragmentation affect the
probability and patterns of infighting? The internal politics of non-state groups have received increasing attention, with recent
research demonstrating the importance of cohesion and fragmentation for understanding conflict dynamics. Yet there is little con-
sensus on how to conceptualize fragmentation, the concept at the center of this agenda, with authors using different definitions and
measures. In this paper we conceptualize fragmentation along three constitutive dimensions: the number of organizations in the
movement; the degree of institutionalization across these organizations; and the distribution of power among them. We then show
how variation across these dimensions can explain variation in important conflict processes, focusing on infighting.
When I came to Spain, and for some time afterwards, I was not
only uninterested in the political situation but unaware of it. I
knew there was a war on, but I had no notion what kind of a war
. . . As for the kaleidoscope of political parties and trade unions,
with their tiresome names—PSUC, POUM, FAI, CNT, UGT,
JCI, JSWU, AIT—they merely exasperated me. It looked at first
sight as though Spain were suffering from a plague of initials . . .
— George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia
Introduction
A s Orwell discovered on arriving in Barcelona in themidst of the Spanish civil war, politics on the groundhave a way of unsettling the categories that struc-
ture our understanding of conflicts. Rather than a united
front against fascism, he found an alliance of competing
socialist, communist, anarcho-syndicalist, and liberal par-
ties and associated militias; Catalan, Basque, and Galician
nationalists split across these ideological divides and
between competing autonomist, separatist, and conserva-
tive political agendas and Catholic and anti-clerical ten-
dencies; and an assortment of nationalities and ideological
rivalries in the international brigades—and that was only
the side of the Republican government. Though these sorts
of internal divisions are fundamental to conflict dynam-
ics, we frequently think of conflicts in terms of cohesive
actors bound by the shared identities and interests of the
groups they claim to represent: Chechens and Russians;
Israelis and Palestinians; Iraq’s Shia, Sunni and Kurdish
communities; Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka; and the
National Transitional Council opposition and Gaddhafi
loyalists in Libya. But “actorness” is seldom something we
can take for granted in politics, especially in civil wars.
One observes, for example, internecine fighting between
Chechen factions, a Palestine divided between dominant
Fatah and Hamas parties, rivalry between factions com-
peting to represent Iraq’s Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish com-
munities, the role of pro-state Tamil paramilitaries in the
defeat of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the tenuous
unity of the rebel opposition during the recent Libyan
uprising. There is great diversity in the ways movements
can be internally divided and in the implications this vari-
ation has on how conflict unfolds.
How do we conceptualize this fragmentation? And how
does variation in fragmentation affect important conflict
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processes? In this paper, we conceptualize fragmentation
in a way that distinguishes among three dimensions along
which movements fragment or cohere: (1) the number of
organizations in a movement; (2) the degree of institu-
tionalization across these organizations; and (3) the dis-
tribution of power among them. By clearly defining these
dimensions and linking them to empirical indicators and
measures, it becomes possible to compare degrees and
types of fragmentation, both within and across move-
ments. After conceptualizing fragmentation, we theoret-
ically connect specific dimensions of fragmentation to
variation in conflict processes. We focus on infighting, as
it is one of the most serious consequences of fragmenta-
tion and disunity. Many prevailing theories of conflict
cannot make sense of infighting, as the assumption of a
two-sided conflict between unitary actors meets the real-
ity of complex struggles involving numerous actors, and
action moves from the macropolitical cleavage to local
conflicts where narrow feuds, personal ambitions, and
private motives predominate.1
A number of recent studies suggest that fragmentation
plays a key role in conflict. Recent works have connected
variation in fragmentation to the onset of violence,2 the
direction, targets, or types of violence,3 and the likeli-
hood and durability of peace settlements.4 But ways of
assessing fragmentation and its corresponding implica-
tions vary widely. This study aims to bring coherence to
the emerging research program on fragmentation and
armed conflict. Valid concepts are the starting point for
sound theories,5 yet research on fragmentation in civil
wars has reached little consensus when it comes to this
first step in theory building. This matters both because
our assessments of how internally divided movements are
rely on the indicators we use to measure fragmentation,
and because a focus on certain dimensions of the con-
cept draws our attention to some questions while blind-
ing us to others.
We emphasize the fragmentation of movements engaged
in armed struggles against the state, drawing on diverse
examples such as Chechnya, Darfur, and Sri Lanka. Yet
the scope of the conceptual exercise in this paper is not
limited to civil wars. Political anthropology and sociol-
ogy have long debated the role of factionalism and intra-
group conflict in social change and the organizational
structure of gangs.6 Political scientists recognize that actor-
ness or lack thereof has important implications for polit-
ical parties,7 social movements,8 labor politics,9 and ruling
parties in authoritarian states.10 Indeed, fragmentation
will have consequences for any movement that acts in
the pursuit of a collective interest on behalf of a particu-
lar group, as each organization within the overarching
movement finds itself in a “dual contest”: a contest in the
pursuit of the common good for the group as a whole
and a contest over private advantages with other factions
in the movement.11
The article proceeds in three parts. First, we conceptu-
alize fragmentation in terms of three constituent dimen-
sions. Our purpose here is mainly conceptual, but in the
interest of theory building we offer preliminary conjec-
tures on the sources of variation in these core attributes of
fragmentation. Second, we illustrate the explanatory power
of conceptualizing fragmentation in this way by showing
how variation in these dimensions matters for infighting
within movements. Third, we conclude with a call for
greater attention to the causal dynamics of fragmentation
in violent conflicts, raise questions for further research,
and point to connections beyond the civil war literature.
Conceptualizing Fragmentation
One of the most promising avenues of research on intra-
state conflict looks beneath abstract “groups” to alliances,
organizations, networks, and even individuals. Much pre-
vious research assumes stable group boundaries and iden-
tities, moving (with more or less justification) from a
challenge to state authority to the existence of relatively
unified movements acting on behalf of bounded, non-
state groups.12 Interactions between the state and non-
state actors are important and revealing. But the aggregate
properties of abstract groups seldom tell us “who is killing
whom, or who allies with whom across which political or
territorial divides”.13
In contrast, recent work regards actors not as unitary or
coherent challengers, but as a shifting set of actors who
share a central identity but who have malleable allegiances
and potentially divergent interests.14 This shift reflects a
reaction against “groupism,” or “the tendency to treat eth-
nic groups, nations and races as substantial entities to which
interests and agency can be attributed”.15 Rather, the iden-
tities, interests, and boundaries of groups are treated as an
outcome of contentious processes, as well as their cause.
The questions motivating this literature thus ask why, given
the multiplicity of competing identities and conflicting
interests in any given society, movements mobilize around
particular identities, and why conflicts take place along
particular issues. Similarly, others have asked why some
groups form cohesive movements, while others remain
internally divided on these fundamental matters.16
This paper helps us think about these questions by con-
ceptualizing fragmentation. Our focus is intra-movement
dynamics, or more precisely, the interaction of organiza-
tions mobilized around a collective identity in pursuit of
particular interests related to this identity in a fundamen-
tal way. This focus includes movements comprised of orga-
nizations mobilizing on the basis of ethnic, tribal, clan,
linguistic, or national identities, as well as movements act-
ing in the name of ideological identities strong enough to
engender a crucial sense of shared interests and common
fate. Three elements require elaboration here. First, we
define a movement in terms of appeals to a shared identity
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we allow for substantial disagreement over interests, rather
than presuming that movements necessarily possess “com-
mon purposes and solidarity”.17 Second, the relevant inter-
ests are “particular” to some group in the sense that they
exclude members of other groups, making for us-versus-
them thinking (e.g., Igbo versus Hausa versus Yoruba, or
Abkhaz versus Georgian). Third, organizational member-
ship in the movement requires that interests relate to the
shared identity in a fundamental way, excluding those that
invoke it only tangentially. Thus, a movement represents
an underlying group in whose name and interest it—and
its constituent organizations—claims to act. Indeed, such
claims themselves are an attempt to draw the boundaries
around this constituency. A group’s precise membership
and interests are up for grabs, and contesting these bound-
aries and interests is an important source of internal divi-
sion and conflict.
In this article, we draw many of our examples from
non-state self-determination movements, which typically
organize around ethno-nationalism. Importantly, how-
ever, our analysis has implications beyond the categories
of non-state actors, ethno-political movements, or even
struggles at the level of the state. First, though sovereign
states generally enjoy advantages in terms of power, insti-
tutionalization, and external recognition that generate
greater degrees of unity than the non-state actors challeng-
ing them, they are also the site of intense competition
between rival organizations with conflicting identities and
interests, as our opening example of Republican Spain
amply demonstrates. Indeed, sometimes a state intention-
ally delegates even the use of violence to non-state groups—
militias—and one can think of the relationship between
the state and its militias in terms of fragmentation.18
Second, nested within identities mobilized at the national
level are innumerable sub-identities that divide along the
lines of region, clan, tribe, caste, ideology, or some other
basis; in some cases, national identities might be part of
broader supra- or transnational identities, as with the Kurds,
Basques, or Muslim Ummah. In the final years of the Barre
regime in Somalia, for example, the Isaaq clan family man-
aged to present a unified front under the Somali National
Movement, only to see tensions erupt into an intra-Isaaq
civil war after the collapse of the state. The salience of
sub-clan, clan, and clan family identities shifted through
the course of the conflict, generating multiple alliances
and movements at different levels. Our focus on fragmen-
tation in struggles occurring between states and non-state
actors is not intended to deemphasize the salience of these
other identities.
Finally, our discussion can apply equally to ethnic, ideo-
logical, and class-based movements. Ethnic boundaries
represent potentially potent cleavages for conflict, and
ethnicity’s capacity for social mobilization is generally
deemed greater than that of class or ideology.19 But despite
ethnic identities’ powerful potential in mobilizing people
and hardening group boundaries, most ethno-political
movements resemble ideological movements in that they
encompass a wide variety of factions rivaling one another
for leadership and influence.
While recent studies have connected variation in frag-
mentation to important civil war processes and outcomes,
fragmentation has been defined and measured in different
ways across these studies. One approach has been to con-
sider fragmentation in terms of the number of organiza-
tions competing for dominance in the overall movement
representing the group, with an increase in the number
corresponding to an increase in fragmentation.20 A related
approach focuses on splits in existing organizations,21 while
others have conceived of fragmentation in terms the degree
of institutionalization among organizations in a group.22
While these two approaches capture important dimen-
sions of fragmentation, they each miss something of the
larger conceptual picture. Focusing on a specific aspect of
fragmentation simplifies the process of theorizing (and
expedites the coding of datasets). But much theoretically
significant variation is lost. Attention to the number of
organizations, for instance, ignores institutional channels
that potentially attenuate the politics of inter-organizational
competition. Encompassing institutions, like the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO), or the United Dem-
ocratic Front (UDF) in the anti-apartheid struggle in South
Africa in the 1980s, can alter the characteristics and con-
sequences of numerous competing organizations in divided
movements. Inversely, institutional representation of some
organizations but not others, or exclusionary institutions
that represent only one subset of the group, are likely to
have different effects on conflict dynamics. Even marginal
organizations outside institutions seeking to create a united
front can have important impacts through spoiling behav-
ior or co-optation into government counterinsurgency
efforts. In Palestine, Hamas remained outside the PLO,
while South African security services supported the Inkatha
Freedom Party (IFP) against the African National Con-
gress and its allies in the UDF.
Moreover, little attention has been paid thus far to the
distribution of power across organizations.23 It clearly mat-
ters whether power within the movement rests with one
dominant organization or with numerous, more or less
equally-powerful ones, and whether powerful organiza-
tions participate in institutional umbrellas or are hostile
to them. In South Sudan’s most recent civil war, for exam-
ple, southern resistance shifted between a fragmented move-
ment in which power was dispersed, and a more cohesive
one in which the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/
Army (SPLM/A) was dominant. Moreover, the split
between a powerful splinter group and the rump SPLM/A,
leading to a widespread and bloody internal struggle, was
a pivotal moment in the conflict.
Finally, much of the literature has focused on more
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the concept itself, discussing intragroup infighting and
strategic interaction with government forces,24 and spoil-
ing behavior around peace settlements25 or in response to
repression.26 Infighting, defection, and spoiling are cer-
tainly causally linked to fragmentation, but they do not
constitute fragmentation; a movement can be frag-
mented without violently turning against itself or having
differences over peace settlements escalate to violence.
We argue that it is best to explicitly leave these processes
and outcomes—along with others such as outbidding or
recruitment, which are clearly causally linked to
fragmentation—out of the concept. Doing so creates theo-
retical opportunities to untangle the mechanisms that
connect fragmentation to these processes.
Many of the ways scholars have defined fragmenta-
tion are largely complementary and provide the building
blocks of a better conceptualization. We therefore build
on this previous work in conceptualizing fragmentation
as a multidimensional concept.27 Subsequently, we explain
fragmentation’s three constitutive dimensions and their
measures and indicators, and provide preliminary theory-
building conjectures on why groups are more or less frag-
mented in terms of these core properties. Notably, while
the literature has paid relatively little attention to concep-
tualizing the negative values of fragmentation, namely
cohesion,28 we consider fragmentation as a scale ranging
from unified to fragmented, and on different dimen-
sions. With this multidimensional concept, we can cap-
ture the reality of fragmentation as a characteristic that
can change over time, with the degree and type of frag-
mentation shifting as organizations are eliminated and
new ones emerge, institutions coordinate actions in the
larger struggle or become irrelevant, and power within
the group is dispersed across organizations or concen-
trated within one of them. Figure 1 represents this con-
cept, illustrating the links between the number of
organizations, their institutional connections to one
another, and the distribution of power across organizations.
Number of Organizations
One core dimension of fragmentation involves the num-
ber of organizations in a movement operating on behalf of
the group they claim to represent. Fragmented move-
ments differ according to whether they are divided between
a few or many competing organizations, whereas cohesive
groups unite in one organization. Splintering within non-
state actors, especially in civil wars, is common. In most
self-determination struggles since the 1960s, for example,
movements challenging the state contain more—and often
many more—than one organization.29 One study con-
cluded that splintering occurred in almost half of all civil
wars since 1989.30
Measuring the number of organizations entails identi-
fying organizations within the broader movement that rec-
ognize no higher command authority, have their own
leadership and organizational structure (including resources
and memberships), and actively make demands related to
the group’s collective aims or status. The demands of dif-
ferent organizations do not need to be identical, and can
even to some degree conflict with one another. Some orga-
nizations may encompass subsets of the overarching group
(for example, the wealthier or poorer strata of an ethnic
group, or specific tribes in a larger ethnic or regional iden-
tity), but the organizations that count when determining
boundaries and membership should all claim to represent
an overlapping, collective identity and pursue interests
particular to it. Relevant organizations can also vary in
term of the strategy they employ, including armed fac-
tions, paramilitary organizations, political parties, trade
unions, and civic organizations mobilized around these
claims. Importantly, this count should exclude institu-
tions that merely coordinate among existing independent
organizations, such as “fronts” or “coordinating commit-
tees,” which we include under the dimension of institu-
tionalization below.
The existence of multiple organizations within the same
movement can suggest underlying disagreements over col-
lective interests or the means to achieve them. The link
between these organizations (and the logic behind link-
ing them together in a movement) is that all are mobi-
lized around a collective identity in the pursuit of interests
particular to this identity and the shared interests and
common fate it engenders. For example, organizations in
the Corsican self-determination movement all seek to
influence the status of the island within France at the
expense of the French government’s authority, and the
island’s Corsican population as a whole cannot be excluded
from any changes that are achieved. Yet, individual orga-
nizations within the Corsican movement have different
ideas about the extent to which power should be devolved,
how this should be pursued, and to whom authority
Figure 1
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ultimately should be passed. Moreover, clan-based ties
and struggles between individual leaders within the move-
ment over time have contributed as much as any pro-
claimed divergence over tactics and aims to the multitude
of Corsican organizations.31
As we note above, a variety of factors affect the number
of organizations competing to represent the group. In addi-
tion to any divergence over interests and strategy, intra-
group pluralism, particularly as a legacy of local political
competition, ideological divides, or social and geographic
cleavages, is a primary source of division—just as social
structures may shape political party factionalism. Organi-
zational factors, such as discipline and internal control,
are also crucial in preventing defections and factional splits.
Processes endogenous to conflict, such as leadership rival-
ries, counter-insurgency strategies aimed at divide-and-
rule or leadership decapitation, and the shift from guerilla
warfare waged by small, isolated groups to large-scale con-
ventional warfare, can also be linked to changes in the
number of organizations. Conversely, a process of fac-
tional amalgamation, the preferences of external patrons
for unity, or solidarity in the face of repression from a
common enemy can decrease the number of independent
groups.32
In wartime Poland, for instance, pre-war political cleav-
ages within the Jewish community divided resistance to
the German occupation across numerous organizations.
Electoral competition in pre-war Poland created Jewish
parties that provided a basis for the mobilization of armed
resistance, but fragmented the community into militarist,
conservative, centrist, and left-wing parties. But regardless
of their political and ideological differences, all of these
organizations were concerned about the political status of
Polish Jews. By late 1942, after most of the community
had been deported to labor or death camps, “it was Jewish
certainty of common death that enabled cooperative Jew-
ish resistance”.33 Numerous Jewish organizations came
together at this crucial period, amalgamating around the
right-wing Jewish Military Union and the leftist Jewish
Combat Organization, which coordinated resistance and
fought together in the doomed Warsaw Ghetto uprising
in spring 1943.34
The number of distinct organizations in a group (and
the role that their divergent interests can play) is one impor-
tant component of fragmentation. Yet simply counting
the number of organizations assumes that each of these
organizations is equivalent to one another and that the
relationship between them is similar across different cases.
The second and third dimensions of our conceptualiza-
tion directly address these two concerns.
Institutionalization
A key characteristic distinguishing more fragmented move-
ments from more cohesive ones is the absence, weakness,
or strength of institutions coordinating the actions of dif-
ferent organizations representing the group. Institutions
can be broadly considered the rules of the game in a soci-
ety, or “the humanly devised constrains that construct
human interaction”.35 Existing works address institution-
alization in the context of cohesion and fragmentation to
varying degrees,36 but institutionalization is often implicit
and requires greater attention. This is particularly true
because while many states tend to develop and maintain
strong institutions, there is much greater variation in the
ability of non-state movements to do so.
Institutions can include both formal and informal rules,
such as norms, routines, customs, and traditions, and all
political actors can be evaluated on the degree to which
they are institutionalized. Contemporary states tend to be
highly institutionalized, with “sticky” rules and decision-
making structures that determine how politics works; even
many “weak states” are generally more institutionalized
than the opposition movements challenging them.37 In
contrast, the level of institutionalization varies quite widely
for non-state actors, be they self-determination move-
ments or other types of social movements. Importantly,
even movements divided among numerous independent
organizations can act with a degree of cohesion when they
cooperate through strong overarching institutions, such as
regional governments, popular fronts, unity teams, resis-
tance movements, central committees, rebel governments-
in-exile, or liberated zones.
For empirical measures and indicators to compare insti-
tutionalization across cases, it may be necessary to focus
on formal institutions despite the importance of infor-
mal institutions in many contexts, such as Pashtunwali
among Pashtuns, blood vendetta for some groups in the
Caucasus, or the Somali customary law system xeer. Insti-
tutions vary in breadth, or how encompassing they are in
their membership, and depth, or how constraining they
are for member organizations. This variation allows us to
distinguish informal political coalitions and loose alli-
ances from more robust institutional arrangements. For a
movement to be strongly institutionalized, the overarch-
ing institution linking organizations must be both broad
in its memberships and deep in the extent to which it
constrains its members’ autonomy. Highly institutional-
ized movements look more like states, in that respected
rules coordinate and constrain the actions of most impor-
tant organizations in the movement (breadth) through
formal rules and structures, including mechanisms for
monitoring and enforcement (depth). Conversely, weakly
institutionalized movements are restricted to only a nar-
row sub-set of organizations in the movement and lack
rules and mechanisms to monitor and constrain their
members.38
At times, institutions that encompass numerous inde-
pendent organizations evolve into independent organiza-
tions in their own right through amalgamation of the
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many decolonization movements, such as the Liberation
Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) or National Libera-
tion Front in Algeria (FLN), were created through the
merger of smaller organizations. Command authority
is the appropriate empirical indicator to understand
this relationship: when an organization recognizes an
institution’s higher authority, the organization ceases to
exist as a totally independent organization and the insti-
tution itself becomes an organization representing the
group. By contrast, organizations that ally themselves with
other organizations but do not fully amalgamate their
command structures under a common leadership should
still be counted as independent.39 The relationship between
the ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU), the South African Communist Party (SACP),
and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) illustrates these differ-
ences. The ANC, COSATU, and the SACP began as
independent organizations, but quickly formed an
alliance—a form of weak institutionalization—in the cir-
cumstances of underground struggle. As their member-
ships blurred and institutionalization became far stronger,
the ANC evolved into an institutional linchpin, even
though all three organizations retained their indepen-
dence. The MK, however, which was originally set up as
an independent organization drawing on ANC and SACP
members, lost its independence as it was gradually sub-
sumed by the ANC and became its armed wing.40
The relative degree of institutionalization often reflects
the institutional endowments of the movement in ques-
tion and the group they represent. Control of (some) state
institutions, like regional parliaments, or access to struc-
tures in civil society, like social networks and civic orga-
nizations, can provide an infrastructure for coordinating
actions (especially for regionally concentrated separatist
groups41) and allow for greater unity.42
The degree to which a movement is institutionalized
may be, to some extent, endogenous to the dispute it is
engaged in. The strength of the state contesting a
movement’s aims, its tolerance for independent institu-
tional structures in civil society, and its strategies for man-
aging resistance might explain some of the variance in
the strength of institutions across different groups. In
democratic settings, for instance, regional legislatures often
coordinate behavior among different organizations repre-
senting the non-state group concentrated in that region
and allow for a high degree of institutionalization of the
non-state actor. Conversely, strong authoritarian states
are likely to prove a less conducive environment for insti-
tution building. Some states may seek to promote insti-
tutional links between rival organizations in order to have
viable interlocutors in peace negotiations, while others
deploy strategies of divide-and-rule that target institu-
tional links between opposition groups. Thus, the con-
text of the dispute, particularly the type of state the
movement faces and the strategies that state is willing
and able to employ, should influence the degree to which
a movement is institutionalized.
Other sources of variation in institutional strength
endogenous to conflict include the type of warfare and the
role of outside actors. The type of warfare in a conflict
often creates different incentives to create bridging insti-
tutions: conventional warfare requires centralized com-
mand, while forms of asymmetric warfare are more
amenable to autonomous organizations operating locally
across isolated fronts. Moreover, external actors might also
play important roles in the institutional strength of ties
between organizations. Outsiders often push factions to
create institutional structures fostering greater unity, as
the Organization of African Unity’s Liberation Commit-
tee attempted to do with movements fighting colonial
rule and apartheid.43 State sponsors offering sanctuary to
rebel governments-in-exile frequently assist with institu-
tion building, at times by deploying their intelligence and
security services to fend off defections and splits. But out-
side states can also undermine efforts to create overarch-
ing institutions so as to keep clients weak, pliable, and
dependent on continued support in proxy wars.
The war in Nagorno-Karabakh, an autonomous region
of Azerbaijan in the Soviet Union, illustrates the impor-
tance of institutionalization. When fighting broke out in
1988, the Armenian side was divided among a number of
militias, with as many as fifty paramilitary groups fighting
a separatist insurgency against Azerbaijani and Soviet forces,
and governments in Armenia and Karabakh pursuing dif-
ferent aims.44 Although political competition was intense
between competing Armenian organizations, disparate
groups of communists and radical nationalists gradually
came together around the war in Karabakh. In late 1992,
military rule under a State Defense Committee built on
the bureaucratic structure of the Karabakh autonomous
region, mobilizing its resources and integrating informal
militia for conventional warfare. Various Armenian mili-
tias were absorbed into a formal military that coordinated
closely with the forces of newly independent Armenia. In
Azerbaijan, however, the post-Soviet government remained
internally divided between competing factions. Successive
governments in independent Azerbaijan never managed
to overcome these internal divisions and properly orga-
nize the competing militias, or the patriot-businessmen
who mobilized them (most of whom regarded the war in
Karabakh as secondary to the struggle for power in Baku).
When a ceasefire held in 1994, the Armenian victory owed
much to levels of institutionalization that were able to
first coordinate and then integrate different factions into a
single organization.
In sum, the degree of institutionalization of a move-
ment characterizes the ties between organizations that it
comprises. In weakly institutionalized movements, orga-
nizations work alone, with little coordinated action.
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states, with a higher degree of cooperation and more reg-
ulated interaction between organizations. In movements
that fall between these extremes, we should see coordinat-
ing institutions and structures that at times fail to be as
constraining or self-reinforcing as they are in strong states.
Thus the degree of institutionalization in many move-
ments will fluctuate.
Distribution of Power
Groups also vary in terms of the distribution of power
across organizations in the group. In a very basic sense, we
can consider a group as more fragmented when power is
dispersed across multiple factions within the group. Con-
versely, where a group with numerous organizations is
dominated by one powerful organization, the conse-
quences of being internally divided are diminished, as
“weaker” organizations have a limited ability to influence
either other factions or the larger dispute.
There are multiple conceptions of power. These range
from thinking of power as an asymmetric relationship of
influence,45 to the broader definition of power as the pro-
duction, in and through social relations, of effects that
shape the capacities of actors to determine their circum-
stances and fate.46 We are unlikely to add anything sub-
stantive to what has already been said in the voluminous
literature on power beyond the observation that careful
scholarship requires attention to the many forms of power
that define what is possible for actors in particular situa-
tions. The power of organizations comes from material
resources like money, manpower, and arms, which are use-
ful in direct compulsion, but is also shaped by ideational
factors, such as a sense of legitimacy, popular support,
public opinion, and leadership. Power is contextual, with
the prevailing type of conflict often determining which
sorts of capabilities and endowments matter. During peri-
ods of peaceful electoral competition, for instance, the
ability to get supporters to the polls puts a premium on
broad popular support and organization, whereas in peri-
ods of fighting, military skill, motivation, weapons, and
access to supplies might matter far more than popular
support.
In terms of empirical indicators, scholars assessing power
in the international relations literature have tended to look
at military figures, the ability to extract resources, and
GDP.47 For non-state actors, large-n studies have used
troop numbers as one empirical indicator of rebel capac-
ity,48 while the social movement literature assesses move-
ment strength through resources such as societal support,
members, money, infrastructure and facilities, access to
policy makers, and external support.49 But there is reason
to doubt the utility of relying exclusively on material prox-
ies, given the wide variety of factors shaping power and
the effectiveness with which organizations make use of the
resources available to them.50 Indeed, the context in which
the dispute occurs will affect the utility of different instru-
ments of power. In active civil wars, for example, military
strength plays a more central role in determining relative
power across organizations. Yet in non-conflict situations,
or even post-conflict situations, resorting to arms can
delegitimize an organization, effectively limiting its influ-
ence. Non-material factors like ideology, political institu-
tions, culture, legitimacy, and links to local communities
all shape relative power. Pearlman, for instance, examines
whether a movement has popularly-shared goals, which
one can think of as a form of organizational power based
on a consensus over objectives.51 Given that key to any
power relationship is the ability of one actor to influence
the acts of another, one potential solution to the problem
of identifying empirical indicators is to embrace the prob-
lem of endogeneity and use outcomes to infer power dis-
tributions ex post: the results of elections, splits, battles,
bargaining, and other turning points can all reveal infor-
mation about relative power and perceptions of power.
Measuring the relative power of competing organiza-
tions is a difficult task for case-oriented researchers with
expertise on a particular conflict, a challenge compounded
for researchers comparing many cases. Nonetheless, it is
possible to estimate whether power is concentrated or dis-
persed across organizations within a movement, and
whether some organizations are clearly more powerful than
others. At the most basic level, this could be a dichoto-
mous measure that assesses whether power is concentrated
in one organization or not, while a more fine-grained mea-
sure would distinguish among different configurations
(such as unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar). The high mar-
gins of error involved in such an estimate have to be
weighed against the consequences of excluding this cru-
cial attribute of fragmentation. Arguably, the theoretical
payoff from including estimates of the distribution of power
within the group outweighs the costs of measurement
errors.
The sources of variation in the distribution of power
within groups are numerous, but reflect three general
categories. First, internal to the movement, the disper-
sion or concentration of power often reflects patterns in
intragroup politics, variable access to power resources,
different levels of organizational efficiency and cohesion,
historical and sometimes path-dependent legacies, alli-
ances across organizations, and realignments within the
movement. Second, external to the movement, shifts in
outside support (including the intervention of outside
actors and government support for collaborating fac-
tions) can quickly and radically alter existing power dis-
tributions. Third, the distribution of power within the
movement also interacts with institutionalization and the
number of organizations. Because institutions constrain
actors, organizations operating in a more strongly insti-
tutionalized movement will be inhibited in the ways that
they can exercise power. For example, a militant wing of





June 2012 | Vol. 10/No. 2 271
against the party it is connected to than it would be in
attacking an organization it has no institutional ties to.
The degree of institutionalization can also shape the dis-
tribution of power within a movement. In a weakly insti-
tutionalized movement, where the institutions do not
encompass all organizations, the power of the coalition
of organizations that are linked through institutions ver-
sus those organizations operating outside these institu-
tions can contribute to the creation of rival blocs. Thus,
to assess fragmentation, the distribution of power within
the group must be considered in tandem with the num-
ber of competing organizations and the institutional ties
between them.
In Kosovo in the early 1990s, for example, power was
concentrated in the pacifist Democratic League of Kos-
ovo (LDK), an elite-led movement with massive popular
support that harnessed Albanian nationalism to resist Ser-
bian rule. The party won unofficial elections in 1992 in a
landslide, then organized a boycott of state institutions
and created a parallel state structure for Kosovar Alba-
nians, who acknowledged its leadership role in the move-
ment. The LDK’s dominance over weaker and more
militant competitors in the movement gave way to a
short period of uncertainty and rough parity between
Kosovo Albanian organizations when an initially small
number of militants around the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) launched an insurgency in 1997. Within a year,
popular support on the ground and in the diaspora shifted
from the LDK to the militant KLA. The KLA’s domi-
nance grew after it gained access to arms depots in neigh-
boring Albania and became the main beneficiary of NATO
intervention in 1999.52 After the war, however, with the
UN administration insisting on multi-party democratic
institutions, power was again dispersed across political
parties based on wartime organizational structures and
allegiances, splitting the KLA into successor parties led
by ex-commanders.
The distribution of power among organizations is inte-
gral to conceptualizing fragmentation, and is intimately
linked to institutionalization and the number of organi-
zations in the movement. Movements with more central-
ized power will be more cohesive, but the exercise of
different types of influence is contingent on the ties between
organizations and the larger context of the dispute.
Mapping Fragmentation and Cohesion
Our goal here is to create a conceptual map of types of
fragmentation that can guide theorizing about its effects
on conflict. Fragmented movements are not all the same,
and we will argue that we can identify important pat-
terns of fragmentation. Putting these three properties
together—number of organizations, institutionalization
of the movement, and distribution of power—yields a
three-dimensional concept of fragmentation represented
visually in Figure 2 below: the vertical leg is the number
of organizations; the line to the left is the degree of
institutionalization; and the line to the right is the degree
to which power is distributed among the organizations.
At any time, a movement can be placed on each axis of
this three-dimensional space. If the group is extremely frag-
mented, it is divided into multiple organizations, with each
holding a share of power, and with fewer binding institu-
tional links between them, as in Figure 3a below. As we move
inward on each dimension, the movement becomes more
cohesive as organizations amalgamate or are eliminated,
institutional links become broader and deeper, and a single
organization ultimately comes to dominate political life, as
illustrated in Figure 3b below. Few groups achieve this high
degree of cohesion, but some come close.
The Eritrean liberation movement, for example, even-
tually attained a remarkable degree of cohesion under the
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). During the
1970s, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) suffered a series
of defections that led to multiple contenders for leader-
ship of the Eritrean resistance movement fighting for inde-
pendence from Ethiopia. With the absence of institutional
ties between these organizations, and with each organiza-
tion relatively evenly matched, the movement was extremely
fragmented, as in Figure 3a. However, after two of the
factions united to create the EPLF, power shifted to this
organization. By the early 1980s, the EPLF became the
dominant force by pushing the ELF out of Eritrea and
integrating its splintered remnants.53 This left the sort of
cohesive movement depicted in 3b.
In moving from a high degree of fragmentation in the
mid-1970s to a high degree of cohesion in the 1980s, the
Figure 2
Three Dimensions of Fragmentation
Note: The figure illustrates the shapes that fragmentation can
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movement passed through various types of fragmenta-
tion. Like most movements, the Eritrean liberation move-
ment was not merely fragmented but fragmented in
different ways as organizational divisions, institutionaliza-
tion, and the distribution of power changed. Based on a
group’s position on each of the dimensions, we can imag-
ine different “triangles” representing different types of frag-
mentation, with their own causes and consequences. Below,
we explore these types of variation and their implications
for infighting in more detail.
Implications: Hypotheses on
Fragmentation and Infighting
To demonstrate the utility of our conceptualization, we
focus on probabilities and patterns of infighting, defined
as violent conflict between organizations belonging to the
same movement. While both policy makers and scholars
have tended to focus on violence between the state and its
challenger groups, violence within these groups is a com-
mon feature in civil wars and accounts for a significant
share of the violence in many conflicts. Infighting is poten-
tially one of the most significant consequences of fragmen-
tation. Infighting undermines a movement’s capacity for
collective action and diverts energy away from the pursuit
of public, political aims and towards the pursuit of private
advantage. It also alters the targets of violence, redirecting
violence away from the state the movement is challenging
and back towards rival organizations.54
Variation in the type of fragmentation suggests unique
hypotheses that connect fragmentation to infighting. We
focus on the probability and pattern of infighting: proba-
bility refers to the likelihood that at any given time orga-
nizations in the same movement will engage in armed
conflict with one another; pattern indicates who fights
whom and with what consequences in terms of the spread
and extent of violence. A basic assumption we make here
is that while all organizations are motivated to some extent
by the collective interests that constitute them as a move-
ment, there are often incentives for turning conflict inward.
Incentives for infighting can result from the desire of each
particular organization to simultaneously achieve some pri-
vate benefit, such as access to power, influence, resources,
positions, or leadership within the movement. Winning
the struggle can matter less than which organization deliv-
ers the victory and enjoys the spoils. Infighting can also
arise from incentives relating to the collective benefits for
the group they represent; specific organizations may be
committed to a particular vision of the collective goal
(such as independence, as opposed to greater autonomy)
or to a strategy (armed conflict versus non-violent direct
action) that brings them into conflict with other organi-
zations. Alternatively, some groups can use disagreements
about collective aims as a cover for the pursuit of private
advantages. Thus, the pursuit of collective interests tends
to push organizations towards cooperation, while the pur-
suit of private advantages and divergent interests pull them
towards competition.
Given this tension, we explore here how different pat-
terns of fragmentation lead to different propensities toward
violent infighting, and the pattern that fighting is likely to
follow. Of course, infighting can cause changes in fragmen-
tation: violence may alter the number of organizations, shift
the distribution of power among them, and erode or
strengthen the institutional bonds that coordinate and
constrain them. Moreover, just as patterns of cohesion and
fragmentation have multiple causes, including infighting,
Figure 3a
Extreme Fragmentation on Three Dimensions
Figure 3b
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there are multiple reasons organizations in a movement turn
their guns on one another beyond the constraints and oppor-
tunities presented by the number of organizations, distri-
bution of power, and institutionalization in a movement.
In the interest of theory building, we bracket these impor-
tant considerations to discuss baseline hypotheses about how
fragmentation impacts infighting, and return to the ques-
tion of endogeneity in the conclusion.To illustrate, we focus
on cases well known to the authors that illustrate different
configurations of fragmentation, the process through which
changes in fragmentation occur, and the plausibility of our
hypotheses. We include cases that vary along the dimen-
sion of interest selected from diverse geographical settings.
In addition, the cases vary on other variables linked to frag-
mentation and infighting, such as counterinsurgency pol-
icy, geography, types of violence and warfare, ethnic
fractionalization, and state strength and regime type. While
the cases are not designed to test our approach, they do illus-
trate varying types of fragmentation and its dynamic nature.
Systematically examining the possible combinations of
our three dimensions yields a number of possible config-
urations of fragmentation. We include a typological table in
an appendix at the end of this article that explores the
multitude of possible combinations and baseline predic-
tions.55 Here, however, we begin by focusing on the rela-
tive size of the triangles presented in figures 3a and 3b.
Our basic assertion is that the greater the degree of frag-
mentation on each dimension (i.e. the greater the size of
the triangle), the greater the probability of infighting. As
we move along each dimension towards the center of the
figure (indicating greater cohesion on each dimension),
the probability of infighting shrinks, but the pattern of
fighting will be shaped both by the size of the triangle and
its shape—its symmetry/asymmetry. Returning to the dia-
gram in figure 3a, we see a case of extreme fragmentation,
characterized by multiple organizations with only weak
institutional links between them and a relatively even dis-
tribution of power among them. Thus, we hypothesize
that the greater the degree of fragmentation on each dimen-
sion (the larger the triangle), the greater the chance of violent
infighting (H1a). Moreover, we hypothesize that the pat-
tern of infighting in such an extremely fragmented movement
(represented by a large symmetrical triangle) will be wide-
spread and encompass most organizations in conflict with one
another in small-scale, localized, indecisive engagements
(H1b). In such highly fragmented movements, internal
competition will be intense, as each of the multiple orga-
nizations competes against others for various advantages
in localized struggles throughout the community. This
contest among multiple organizations is particularly likely
to escalate to violent infighting, as there is neither an orga-
nization dominant enough to exercise a degree of hege-
mony within the movement, nor overarching institutions
to coordinate the political aims of competing organiza-
tions, constrain personal ambitions, mediate conflicts
between organizations, police other organizations, and
enforce collective rules and decisions. Thus in the absence
of concentrated power and strong overarching institu-
tions, movements consisting of multiple organizations are
likely to be characterized by an encompassing struggle for
power and dominance. Yet because no organization is par-
ticularly strong relative to the others, violence is likely to
be characterized by small-scale but widespread engage-
ments. The weak power of these organizations makes it
unlikely that they will eliminate one another; in the event
that they do, the low barriers to entry in the movement
are likely to see new organizations arise in their place. At
various periods, this sort of extreme fragmentation has
characterized the Darfurian, Chechen, and Sri Lankan
Tamil movements. These movements have moved into or
out of this type of extreme fragmentation as a result of
changes on one or more of the dimensions, with implica-
tions for the probability and pattern of infighting.
Proliferating Organizations: The Splintering of
Resistance in Darfur
Moving beyond the size of the triangle to also consider its
shape, we explore some of the possible consequences of
change along each dimension. First, moving inward along
the first dimension in the triangle can shape the effects of
fragmentation: reducing the number of organizations. We
hypothesize that, holding constant a high degree of fragmen-
tation on other dimensions, movements with fewer organiza-
tions will have a lower probability of infighting (H2a).
Movements with fewer organizations have a limited num-
ber of potential dyads in which incompatibilities, rival-
ries, and local disputes might provoke infighting. The
pattern of infighting in such groups is also expected to be
different than extremely fragmented groups in so far as it
involves fewer organizations. Yet as in extremely frag-
mented groups, fighting between the few competing orga-
nizations is likely to be widespread as organizations and
their supporters from across the community are drawn
into the fighting, while the relatively even dispersion of
power between the groups creates conditions for large-
scale violence. Thus, to the degree that we see infighting
in movements with few organizations, we expect it to be
widespread and encompassing (H2b).
The splintering of Darfur’s opposition in western Sudan
illustrates a movement going through changes in number
of organizations and how such variation affects infight-
ing.56 When the rebellion in Darfur was launched in
2003, it was initially organized around two dominant
organizations in a non-institutionalized alliance, the mil-
itarily powerful Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the
Justice and Equality Movement ( JEM). Quickly, how-
ever, underlying political differences came to the fore and
military cooperation between the SLA and JEM broke
down, resulting in rivalry between the two organizations





Articles | A Plague of Initials
274 Perspectives on Politics
organizations managed to contain, as we would expect in
a movement that only has a few organizations (H2a and
H2b). Between 2005 and 2006, the SLA further frag-
mented into numerous factions, partly as a result of dif-
ferences over a peace settlement, and JEM suffered from
defections and splits, leading Darfur’s opposition to
become extremely fragmented (approximating figure 3a
above). The lines of division in the conflict became even
blurrier as former rebels were co-opted into the
government’s counterinsurgency, and some of the
government’s local proxies defected to the rebels. As this
multi-side violence escalated and spread across Darfur, it
became difficult for organizations to remain outside the
fray. As existing organizations split and new ones emerged,
fighting became widespread, though largely indecisive,
consisting largely of isolated clashes between small splin-
ter groups—consistent with our expectations in H1a and
H1b. Repeated efforts to forge cooperation and build
coalitions between these groups have failed, and the oppo-
sition movement remains extremely fragmented with gen-
eralized conflict among constituent organizations.57
Institutional Decay: The Rise and Fall of
the De Facto Chechen State
Increasing the degree of institutionalization in an extremely
fragmented movement, i.e. moving toward the center on
the institutionalization leg of the triangle, will also change
the probability and pattern of infighting. Indeed, a high
degree of institutionalization will mitigate the conflict-
promoting effects of numerous organizations and a dis-
persion of power within the movement. A high degree of
institutionalization coordinates action and steers intra-
group power struggles through non-violent channels, mak-
ing the probability of infighting low. Moreover, even when
tension exists over leadership within the institution, the
existence of encompassing institutions enables such strug-
gles to be resolved through non-violent means. We hypoth-
esize then that holding constant a high degree of fragmentation
on other dimensions, an increasing degree of institutionaliza-
tion will reduce probability of violent infighting among orga-
nizations (H3a). This reflects both common adherence to
and respect for rules and the constraining nature of bind-
ing institutions. In the unlikely event that infighting does
occur in the context of a highly institutionalized move-
ment, we hypothesize that conflict will originate from new
organizations that arise to challenge the structure or from
organizations that attempt to exit the institution due to inter-
nal rivalry (H3b).
The Chechen case illustrates how changes in the insti-
tutionalization dimension shape the probabilities and pat-
terns of infighting over time. In 1990, the emerging
nationalist movement in Chechnya looked like a broad
coalition of more or less equally-influential organizations
under the institutional umbrella of the Chechen National
Congress.58 Its radical branch, led by General Dzhokhar
Dudayev, soon came to dominate, consolidating its con-
trol over the movement’s armed wing, the National Guard.
By summer 1991, institutionalization also increased as
the National Congress coordinated mass pro-Chechen
independence protests. Dudayev was elected president of
the Chechen Republic in November 1991, boosting his
position and further institutionalizing the movement by
giving it access to the electoral arena. Consistent with
our expectations for an institutionalized movement (H3a),
1990–1991 was a period without any significant infight-
ing among the different Chechen nationalist organiza-
tions. However, the National Congress coalition became
increasingly fragile as Dudayev’s economic program and
bid for independence stalled. By 1993, Dudayev’s former
allies challenged his leadership, leading him to dissolve
the Chechen parliament, essentially eliminating formal
institutional ties among the various actors. Thus in the
time period leading up to Moscow’s invasion of Chech-
nya in December 1994, the Chechen nationalist move-
ment was characterized by many organizations and little
institutionalization. While military power was still con-
centrated in Dudayev’s National Guard, power was increas-
ingly dispersed among other armed organizations. As
expected, this was a period of infighting, primarily in the
form of clashes between those loyal to Dudayev and his
opponents.
The outbreak of war with Moscow reunified the move-
ment under the command of Dudayev and his National
Guard, and the movement once again looked like a broad
coalition of organizations, dominated by one strong orga-
nization, and with some degree of institutionalization
in the form of military and political coordination. Yet
institutionalization was relatively weak, relying on shared
opposition to the Russian threat, and that weakness
quickly became evident when the war ended in 1996.
Indeed, consistent with our expectations of how the
pattern of infighting in an institutionalized movement
will be shaped by organizations leaving due to internal
rivalries for the structure’s leadership (H3b), the 1997
presidential elections in Chechnya pitted former
warlords from the resistance against one another. While
the losers of the elections initially rallied behind the
elected president, Aslan Maskhadov, they soon became
challengers, effectively eroding the president’s state-
building efforts to institutionalize Chechen politics.
Thus in the absence of any institutionalization and in
the presence of numerous, more or less equally-powerful
organizations, Chechnya became in 1997–1998 the scene
of widespread and indecisive struggles among former
warlords fighting for leadership in the movement, consis-
tent with hypotheses H1a and H1b.59 Had Maskhadov’s
state-building efforts succeeded, then, per expectations
for a highly institutionalized movement (H3a), it is likely
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Predation and Centralizing Power: The LTTE in Sri
Lanka.
Finally, changes in the distribution of power between orga-
nizations have implications for the likelihood and pattern
of infighting. Where there are multiple organizations with
weak institutional ties, moving from dispersed power to a
concentration of power in one dominant organization shifts
the movement from extremely fragmented to what we
could consider a more hegemonic movement. While still
fragmented, the presence of a dominant organization alters
and attenuates the consequences of internal divisions. In
this type of movement, more powerful organizations can
police other organizations, deter violent challenges from
weaker rivals, and provide incentives to ally or amalgam-
ate, thus rendering the chances for violent infighting lower
than in extremely fragmented groups. Thus, we hypoth-
esize that holding constant a high degree of fragmentation on
other dimensions, the existence of a dominant organization
will reduce the probability of violent infighting among orga-
nizations as compared to an extremely fragmented movement
(e.g. the one represented in figure 3a) (H4a). Further-
more, we hypothesize that the pattern of fighting in move-
ments in which power is concentrated will involve the
dominant organization fighting select organizations, either
those challenging the strongest organization or targeted by it,
in localized yet decisive fighting (H4b). When stronger orga-
nizations target weaker ones for elimination, infighting is
likely to be more localized. But it is also likely to be more
consequential than the sort of engagements that charac-
terize infighting between numerous equally weak organi-
zations: on the one hand, violence might be one-sided as
powerful groups eliminate weaker challengers, while on
the other it might undercut the dominance of the most
powerful faction. In either case, the process of infighting
itself is likely to have serious consequences for the impor-
tant dimensions of fragmentation—interacting with both
the number of organizations and the distribution of
power—and thus affect future infighting.
The Tamil self-determination movement in Sri Lanka
demonstrates how shifts in power in the movement affect
infighting. Numerous organizations have claimed to rep-
resent the Tamil community since the outbreak of vio-
lence in the early 1970s, including political parties and
trade unions linked in fronts, and a number of armed
factions, namely the “Tamil Five” set of armed groups
that emerged in the mid-1970s and a scattering of smaller
local groups.60 Consistent with the logic of our first hypoth-
eses (H1a and H1b), beginning with the turn to violence
until the mid-1980s, infighting consisted of localized
clashes between weak paramilitary groups competing over
recruits, turf, and influence. By 1986, however, the increas-
ingly powerful Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
attempted to eliminate contending organizations, includ-
ing both rival armed groups and non-violent organiza-
tions, in a ruthless campaign of fratricidal bloodletting
that attempted to physically eliminate the leadership of
rival organizations, including a number of the LTTE’s
former allies and political mentors. Though it could not
completely eradicate all rival organizations, by the late
1980s the LTTE had defeated or weakened all other claim-
ants to leadership of the Tamil nationalist movement, rul-
ing the territory and population under its control in a
highly authoritarian manner. The ensuing period of LTTE
dominance, consistent with hypotheses H4a and H4b,
was characterized by a reduction in infighting as the LTTE
shifted toward relatively selective violence against the lead-
ers and cadres of the remaining paramilitary groups, assas-
sinations of more moderate Tamil politicians, informers,
and LTTE-defectors. A major increase in intra-Tamil fight-
ing followed a defection from within the LTTE that dis-
persed power between the LTTE in the north, and the
ex-LTTE commander Colonel Karuna in the east. The
fighting that followed eventually led to the LTTE being
driven from the east in 2007 and finally defeated in 2009.61
We have highlighted four possible types of fragmenta-
tion with our mapping by altering each of the three dimen-
sions we argue are critical to understanding fragmented
movements. Table 1 recounts each configuration and our
hypotheses on the probability and pattern of infighting.
This mapping of fragmentation suggests the interplay
between the three dimensions and how the effect of each
is likely to be conditioned by the others. For example, the
chance of infighting in movements consisting of few orga-
nizations is likely to be highly conditional on institution-
alization: the absence of institutions that coordinate these
organizations’ behavior or enforce rules means there are
fewer checks on conflicts escalating into violence. More-
over, because only a few organizations dominate politics
in the group, the stakes are that much higher and violence
has the potential to escalate quickly as organizations mobi-
lize their respective followers, whose fortunes are often
linked to those of the organizations they support. To the
degree that we see infighting in movements consisting of
few organizations, the pattern of infighting—who fights
whom—will be determined by the distribution of power
among them. We can also imagine other constellations of
the three dimensions, and the typological table in the
appendix provides an overview of these.
New Research Directions
This article contributes to the growing literature that dis-
aggregates actors in armed conflicts. Yet the implications
of our study go beyond non-state actors in violent set-
tings, to both state and non-state groups engaged in con-
tentious politics, whether violent or non-violent.
Rather than attributing singular agency to movements
composed of diverse and often competing organizations,
the emerging scholarship on fragmentation in civil wars
pays far closer attention to politics within movements
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Table 1
Hypotheses on Fragmentation
Fragmentation mapping Probability of infighting Pattern of infighting
H1a: In an extremely fragmented
movement with many organiza-
tions, weak institutionalization, and
decentralized power, the probability
of violent infighting is very high
H1b: Infighting will be widespread
and encompass most organizations
in small-scale, localized, and
indecisive engagements
H2a: In a movement with weak
institutionalization and decentral-
ized power, reducing the number
of organizations will lower the
probability of infighting
H2b: Infighting, if it occurs, will
likely be widespread, encom-
passing all organizations
H3: In a movement with multiple
organizations and decentralized
power, increasing institutionaliza-
tion will reduce the probability of
violent infighting among
organizations
H3a: The pattern of infighting will
involve new organizations that
arise to challenge the members of
the institution, or existing
organizations that defect from it
H4a: In a movement with multiple
organizations and weak institution-
alization, centralization of power in
a dominant organization reduces
the probability of violent infighting
among organizations, as compared
to an extremely fragmented group
H4b: The pattern of infighting will
be localized yet decisive, involving
select organizations, either those
challenging the strongest
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conceptualization of fragmentation can enhance explana-
tions of important conflict processes, suggesting that move-
ments can be divided in different ways, with distinct
causes and effects. Theoretically and empirically, we focus
on how different types of fragmentation shape violent
infighting in self-determination struggles. Fighting between
organizations ostensibly struggling in the interests of the
same community is perhaps the most serious conse-
quence of fragmentation. Infighting diverts groups from
the aims for which they claim to be fighting, undermin-
ing their potential for collective action and redirecting
energy and violence inwards towards the community
they represent. At the same time, provoking infighting
by flipping factions has become central to counterinsur-
gency dynamics, making it important to understand how
movements cohere and the consequences of fragmenting
them.62
Our conceptualization can also contribute to explana-
tions of other conflict processes. Defection, collaboration,
and side-switching are common features of armed con-
flicts that often reflect the strength of movement institu-
tions and the relative power of different organizations as
much as the literature’s current focus on state policy. Exam-
ining patterns of fragmentation can also enhance our under-
standing of how groups respond to repression—which
organizations are targeted, how repression affects internal
power balances, and the ways state power impacts institu-
tional ties between organizations. The onset of conflict is
often triggered by fragmentation as organizations engage
in violent outbidding, either to mark their emergence, to
adopt new strategies and aims that depart from institu-
tionalized consensus, or even to attack rivals claiming to
represent the same group. Similarly, fragmentation shapes
the outcome of conflicts, including the ways in which the
state accommodates opposition movements, and the degree
to which concessions to the movement actually bring about
peace. Though our focus on infighting emphasizes the
negative consequences of fragmentation, some move-
ments intentionally embrace decentralization, raising fur-
ther questions about how the structure of movements and
campaigns impacts their success.
As we review in this article, a burgeoning research pro-
gram has already begun to demonstrate the effects of frag-
mentation on conflict processes. While the research
program needs a more coherent conceptualization of frag-
mentation, it nonetheless strongly suggests that there are
limitations to an approach employing large-n cross-
sectional studies with variables capturing country-level char-
acteristics, such as regime type, wealth, inequality, ethnic
divisions, terrain, and so forth. In and of itself, a large-n
approach is not the problem. Indeed, as the literature on
fragmentation in armed conflicts has been driven by care-
ful case-specific studies, some of them relying on statisti-
cal analysis within one case, a large-n approach across
cases is essential to assessing the generalizability of find-
ings. The challenge, however, is that for large-n analysis,
collecting data on the number of organizations, how insti-
tutionalized their relationships are, and their relative power
over time is a highly labor-intensive and time-consuming
task even when studying just one movement. Our study
provides guidelines for systematic data collection across
three dimensions of actor fragmentation. Expanding this
conceptual exercise to cover a broader range of move-
ments offers opportunities for comparison. For instance,
if ethnic identity provides a more potent base for mobi-
lizing around a focal point compared to non-ethnic iden-
tities, is there a difference between ethnic and non-ethnic
movements in terms of fragmentation dynamics? What
determines patterns of ad-hoc alliance formation and deeper
institutionalized cooperation within movements? How do
armed and unarmed organizations interact within these
movements?
The research program has primarily focused on the effects
of fragmentation, but as we argue, these effects depend on
how a movement is fragmented. Future research could also
systematically examine the roots of variation in the charac-
ter and causes of fragmentation. Such questions have meth-
odological implications, calling for greater theoretical and
empirical attention to causal mechanisms in the study of
violent conflicts.63 Questions about mechanisms bring up
tricky theoretical concerns about endogeneity. Indeed, to
the degree that the outcome we are interested in explaining
is violent infighting—or related dynamic processes such as
defection or alliance formation—it is almost inescapable
that violence itself is as much a cause of fragmentation as its
effect. Disentangling endogenous relationships, both theo-
retically and empirically, is a challenge for further research
on fragmentation and contentious politics more generally.
The interaction of the three dimensions of fragmentation
may also shape one another; for instance, an organization’s
resources may influence whether its leaders see a need to
cooperate with other organizations by forming institu-
tionalbonds, or similarly, the emergenceof anewactormight
upset existing institutional cooperation. Nonetheless,
infighting tends to be both sporadic and its outcomes unpre-
dictable, making it useful to reason from the degree and
type of fragmentation in a movement to infighting, rather
than the other way around, bearing in mind that infighting
is a process with repercussions for movement unity.
While our focus is on fragmentation in movements
engaged in armed struggles, for peaceful groups, too, such
as non-violent social movements and political parties, there
is variation across the three dimensions of fragmentation
conceptualized here. Social movement scholars use the
term ‘social movement organizations’ to distinguish among
the often numerous organizations that represent one move-
ment, and they have long argued that these organizations
sometimes act in unison, while at other times they find
themselves pitted against one another.64 This literature
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some movements fragment into different organizations,
how fragmented movements institutionalize to form coali-
tions, and the effects of movement fragmentation. For us,
this literature is an excellent starting point for further theo-
rizing the causal mechanisms that foster change along the
three dimensions we highlight here. In turn, our study
provides a stronger conceptual starting point for thinking
systematically about movement fragmentation. For exam-
ple, our inclusion of the power dimension of fragmenta-
tion calls attention to how the distribution of resources
within the nuclear disarmament movement may have not
only caused and been a consequence of intra-movement
competition, but also shaped the ways in which this com-
petition played out.65 In contemporary US politics, both
the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street movements encom-
pass numerous organizations, each confronting dilemmas
about institutionalization and possible cooptation by more
powerful establishment organizations. In sum, beyond spe-
cific cases, the three-dimensional conceptualization of frag-
mentation can help researchers to think more systematically
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